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Corporate Environmental Crime and Environmental Justice 
 
Abstract: Executive Order 12898 (42 U.S.C. § 4321 [2000]) mandates that federal agencies in 
the United States make it their purpose to achieve environmental justice. As a result, agencies 
often rely on empirical studies to provide crucial information that can be used to implement 
policies to combat inequality. While numerous studies now examine the distribution of 
environmental burdens and benefits, there are no systematic empirical studies that examine 
inequality in criminal penalties. This study corrects that omission by presenting findings on the 
relationship between community demographics and monetary penalties (fines) against 
corporations for 121 criminal violations of federal environmental law that were adjudicated 
between the years 2005 and 2010. Our results suggest that fines are not correlated with the 
demographics of residents living near the crime. That is, corporations that committed their 
environmental crimes in minority and poor areas did not receive lower fines as a result. Thus, 
environmental justice concerns appear to be satisfied with respect to federal criminal 
prosecutions. 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Punishment; Environmental Equity; Environmental Crime; Green 
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Introduction 
In 1990 Michael Lynch suggested that a “green criminology” should be at the center of 
the discipline’s development. Within this new green criminology, environmental justice is a 
central concept (Stretesky, 2008). White (2008, 50), for instance, elaborates that green 
criminology must emphasize “environmental justice with a special focus on human rights, social 
equity and ecological justice.” Whether one is using an environmental justice perspective or 
some other perspective such as ecological justice to inform their research, most green 
criminologists now study a range of environmental harms, some of which are legal and some of 
which are illegal (White & Heckenberg, 2014; White, 2013). This study extends the green 
criminology tradition by focusing on environmental justice concerns identified in Executive 
Order 12898 (42 U.S.C. § 4321 [2000]), which mandates that federal policies should encourage 
the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national 
origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”i Specifically, we examine whether the 
composition of race/ethnicity and/or the poverty of communities surrounding environmental 
violations is inversely correlated with the monetary penalties assessed by the federal government 
for those violations. If penalties are, on average, lower in communities that are minority and/or 
poor, then national policies may need to be adopted to tackle that problem. 
The current study is focused specifically on illegal behavior; however, green 
criminologists adopt a framework for studying environmental harm that is inclusive and often 
examine both criminal and non-criminal behavior. This approach is advantageous, and studying 
the adverse effects of legal and illegal actions is nothing new in the discipline. That is, 
criminologists and legal researchers often study activities that are considered legal and legitimate 
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but which nonetheless have detrimental impacts on people and environments (Hillyard & Tombs, 
2007; Sutherland, 1949; White, 2003). The emphasis green criminologists place on studying both 
legal and illegal activities is most easily recognized as advantageous within the real-world 
applications of environmental law. For instance, in US v. White (1991) the testimony from the 
EPA’s assistant administrator emphasizes that the definition of environmental hazards is 
constantly changing as the agency modifies its administrative rules. Therefore, a flexible 
conceptual framework like green criminology is necessary to study the full array of 
environmental harms that may shift between criminal and non-criminal behavior over time and 
place. 
Further, a green criminology framework is advantageous because it allows researchers to 
use traditional criminological theories and/or draw upon theories from other fields, such as 
environmental sociology, when analyzing crimes against the environment (Stretesky et al., 
2014).ii While environmental justice is not nested within a traditional criminological theory, it is 
highly relevant for this study since prosecutors are explicitly mandated by Executive Order 
12898 (42 U.S.C. § 4321 [2000]) to take environmental justice considerations into account when 
prosecuting individuals and corporations for violation of environmental criminal laws (Dighe & 
Pettus, 2011; Stretesky et al., 2014; White, 2013). As such, we examine hypotheses derived from 
an environmental justice perspective to analyze the outcomes of 121 plea bargains,iii obtained via 
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from the U.S. Department of Justice, between the 
years 2005 and 2010 against corporations that were prosecuted for environmental crime.iv 
Environmental Justice 
The environmental justice (sometimes referred to as environmental equity—see generally 
Atlas, 2001; Schlosberg, 2007; Rhodes, 2005) movement is a grassroots effort developing out of 
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the civil rights and environmental movements (Cole & Foster, 2001; Taylor, 2000). The 
movement advocates greater levels of environmental protection and an end to policies 
perpetuating environmental inequality. The movement became prominent in 1983 when 
Reverend Benjamin Chavis—a prominent civil rights activist—held a six-week protest (which 
resulted in over 550 arrests) to rally against the siting of a toxic waste landfill in Warren County, 
North Carolina. The Warren County landfill was constructed to store PCBs that were illegally 
dumped along hundreds of miles of North Carolina road (Bullard, 1994).v As Bullard (1994) 
notes, Warren County residents were poor and African American and he therefore argues that the 
PCBs were being stored in their community because the government viewed it as expendable. 
The Warren County protests brought issues of environmental justice to the forefront of 
the environmental and civil rights movements and served as a springboard for subsequent 
research that revealed that poor and minority communities were overburdened by environmental 
harms (Bullard, 1990; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1983; United Church of Christ, 1987). 
This research, and the work of grassroots advocates, eventually influenced the federal 
government to concern itself with environmental justice. As noted, Executive Order 12898, 
which President Bill Clinton issued on February 11, 1994, instructed each and every federal 
agency to make environmental justice a part of its mission of service (42 U.S.C. § 4321 [2000]).  
Shortly after executive order 12898 (42 U.S.C. § 4321 [2000]) was signed, the U.S. 
Department of Justice created an environmental justice strategy laying out the way 
administrative, civil, and criminal legal actions would be carried out (U.S. Department of Justice, 
1995). While the DOJ and other federal agencies recognize environmental justice concerns and 
state that they are actively working toward alleviating the burden of disproportionate impact 
from environmental harms faced by disadvantaged communities, there is still much work to be 
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done. Indeed, in 2010, the EPA and the White House Council on Environmental Quality met for 
the first time in over a decade and stated that there was still a need for better strategies that 
incorporate environmental justice concerns into criminal prosecutions for violations of 
environmental laws (Dighe & Pettus, 2011). 
While the federal government admits the need for better strategies, no one, to our 
knowledge, has actually determined whether environmental injustices are occurring in outcomes 
of criminal prosecution for violation of environmental criminal laws. Some may argue that there 
is reason to believe environmental injustice is not occurring because federal agencies have been 
cognizant of environmental justice concerns. For example, each year the EPA releases progress 
reports and details various civil and criminal legal actions taken against individuals and 
corporations where environmental justice concerns were a determinant in the punishment 
levied.vi However, the cases listed in these progress reports are anecdotal and limited to only a 
handful of the many civil and criminal actions taken each year. These cases are likely to show 
success stories rather than draw attention to agency problems.vii Therefore, independent research 
is needed to learn whether environmental justice concerns are being taken into consideration on a 
larger scale—not just with a select few cases highlighted on a website. 
Prior Studies 
There are two main areas of inquiry that follow the EPA’s definition of environmental 
justice. The first tract of inquiry focuses on determining whether or not poor and minority 
communities are unduly burdened by environmental hazards because of the communities’ 
proximity to hazardous waste disposal sites and other polluting facilities. If researchers find that 
these facilities are located disproportionately in poor and/or minority communities, then there is 
reason to believe environmental injustice is occurring. A majority of studies in this first tract of 
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inquiry provide evidence that poor and minority communities are more likely to be located near 
hazardous waste disposal sites and/or near a high concentration of polluting facilities (Brown, 
1995; Bryant, 1995; Bullard, 1994; Downey, 1998; Mohai & Bunyon, 1992; Pastor, Sadd, & 
Hipp, 2001; Ringquist, 2005; Stretesky & Hogan, 1998). There are some methodological 
challenges to these conclusions (e.g., Anderton et al., 1994), but a detailed discussion of these 
debates is not necessary for the present analysis.viii  
The second tract of inquiry looks at environmental justice issues within the legal system. 
Specifically, this research focuses on determining whether corporations located in poor and 
minority communities are (1) more likely to be subject to regulatory inspections (Konisky, 
2009); and (2) punished more severely for violating environmental laws in these communities 
(Atlas, 2001; Lavelle & Coyle, 1992; Lynch, Stretesky, & Burns, 2004; Mennis, 2005; and 
Ringquist, 1998). If corporations in poor and/or minority communities are inspected less 
frequently and punished less severely for violations, then there is reason to believe 
environmental injustice is occurring within the legal system by perpetuating environmental 
inequality within these communities. It is this second tract of inquiry which is most relevant to 
our study.  
 Regarding inspections, Konisky (2009) discovered that regulatory agencies carry out 
fewer inspections in poorer counties. Further, Konisky (2009) found that while facilities in poor 
counties are inspected less frequently, there is no evidence suggesting race-based disparities are 
occurring in the case of inspections. Thus, in Konisky’s (2009) study, the environmental injustice 
regarding inspections is experienced by class, not race. 
With respect to studies analyzing legal outcomes assessed against corporations for 
violating environmental laws, there are only a small number of studies that draw upon an 
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environmental justice framework. These studies investigate cases handled in state court or 
federal court and focus on civil and administrative law outcomes—not criminal law. At the state 
level, Mennis (2005) found that air-polluting facilities in New Jersey located in areas with high 
percentages of minorities received fines which were lower than those received by facilities 
located in predominantly white areas. Also, Lynch, Stretesky, & Burns (2004) examined 
penalties assessed against oil refineries in Texas between the years 2001 and 2003 for 
environmental law violations, and found that the penalties assessed against refineries tended to 
be lower in zip code tracts made up primarily of Hispanic and low-income residents. 
At the federal level, there are only three studies examining legal outcomes for civil law 
violations. In 1992, the National Law Journal (hereinafter NLJ) published a study examining the 
fines assessed against corporations for civil environmental violations and how those fines varied 
in size based upon how many minorities lived near a hazard site (Lavelle & Coyle, 1992). The 
NLJ findings claimed that the EPA and the courts engaged in a pattern of discriminatory 
practices—more specifically, as the number of minorities increased around a hazard site, the size 
of the fine assessed against a corporation would decrease. In particular, the NLJ articles claimed 
that penalties in communities predominantly occupied by whites were found to be 46% higher 
than penalties in zip codes with minority residents ($153,067 vs. $105,028), and penalties in zip 
codes with high-income residents were 53% higher than penalties in zip codes with low-income 
residents ($146,993 vs. $95,664).ix 
The NLJ study stimulated significant controversy and additional research. The two major 
studies that followed the NLJ article were Evan Ringquist’s (1998) article “A Question of 
Justice: Equity in Environmental Litigation, 1974-1991” and Mark Atlas’s (2001) follow-up to 
Ringquist’s article, titled “Rush to Judgment: An Empirical Analysis of Environmental Equity in 
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement Actions.” Ringquist’s study adhered to the 
methods used in the NLJ study as much as possible in an effort to replication NLJ’s findings; 
however, he improved on the NLJ study by controlling for judicial and corporation status,x 
among other factors (Ringquist, 1998). Ringquist concluded that there was no negative 
statistically significant relationship between the percentage of minority residents, income, and 
the civil fines assessed against corporations for environmental hazards (Ringquist, 1998, 1162). 
Following Ringquist (1998), Atlas (2001) set out to create the definitive study regarding 
legal outcomes and environmental justice. Atlas (2001) improved upon Ringquist’s research by 
using one-mile concentric rings around a hazard site rather than the larger zip codes where the 
civil violation occurred, to better measure the population affected by the hazard. Further, Atlas 
(2001) attempted to control for the particular circumstances surrounding each case—arguing that 
the potential danger posed by the environmental hazard would be the major determinant for 
receiving a high fine. Atlas (2001) ultimately concluded that there was no negative statistically 
significant relationship between race, income, and monetary penalties assessed against 
corporations for environmental hazards.xi Finally, Atlas (2001) found that the facts of a case best 
predict the outcome of legal actions against corporations for violating environmental law—a 
finding seen in other studies on criminal justice outcomes (see generally Steffensmeier & 
Demuth, 2000). At the federal level, both Ringquist (1998) and Atlas (2001) found that 
environmental injustice was not occurring in civil litigation outcomes involving corporate 
violations of environmental laws. Atlas (2001) rightly argues that looking only at civil case 
outcomes does not represent a holistic view of litigation outcomes—researchers also need to 
look at administrative and criminal case outcomes.  
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This study was designed to answer part of Atlas’s call, as we examine criminal case 
outcomes at the federal level—a context that has not been previously investigated in 
environmental justice research. Criminal cases have serious implications for issues of 
environmental justice. First, criminal prosecutions are supposed to be reserved for only the most 
severe offenses (Black, 1976; O’Hear, 2004). This means that if a corporation violates an 
environmental law, it can be both civilly and criminally liable; however, the criminal prosecution 
should only occur if the violation is so severe that a civil penalty would not be enough to 
compensate victims, pay for cleanup, and serve as an adequate deterrent against future crimes. 
For instance, 33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(7)(D) is a civil statute allowing federal authorities to claim up 
to $100,000 per day if an oil spill results from the “gross negligence” of a corporation. On the 
other hand, the criminal statute 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) allows federal authorities to claim up 
to $250,000 per day if a corporation’s oil spill results from criminal negligence. 
Second, in criminal prosecutions the defendant must be proven to have a specific mindset 
when they committed the crime, and that mental state along with all other evidence must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. For instance, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) requires that the 
defendant “knowingly” committed the crime. Knowing intent is generally defined as engaging in 
conduct where a defendant is practically certain an outcome will occur.!Civil cases, on the other 
hand, rarely have to prove a mental state, and responsibility must be proven only by a 
preponderance of the evidence (i.e., something is true more likely than not). Therefore the 
overall evidentiary burden is much greater in criminal court than in civil court, because of the 
severity associated with criminal sanctions. 
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Third, there is reason to believe that the social ramifications of a criminal conviction and 
the subsequent labeling of a corporation as “criminal” have a much greater negative societal 
effect than simply being found liable for violating a civil statute (Weissmann, 2007). 
With the abovementioned literature and legal context in mind, we have formed two 
hypotheses to inform the present study.  
[H1]: Penalties levied against corporate actors that committed an environmental crime 
will be less severe as the proportion of minorities living near that environmental crime 
increases. 
[H2]: Penalties levied against corporate actors that committed an environmental crime 
will be less severe as the proportion of poor living near the environmental crime 
increases. 
Data and Methods 
To examine the relationship between race, ethnicity, poverty, and penalty outcomes we 
first collected data about the criminal prosecutions of corporations that occurred in the United 
States between 2005 and 2010 (n=245).xii Basic case information about environmental 
prosecutions (case numbers and venues) was obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request 
from the Environmental Protection Agency for all cases that were forwarded and accepted for 
criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice. In the United States, the Department of 
Justice acts as the prosecutor for federal agencies in criminal cases—though DOJ attorneys often 
collaborate with attorneys from the agencies forwarding cases to them for prosecution. The 
information from the EPA allowed us to match Department of Justice case numbers to online 
electronic case files submitted to a legal database called PACER.xiii,xiv The following information 
was collected from PACER: (1) the original criminal complaint or indictment; (2) plea 
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agreements; (3) the factual basis for the plea agreement; and (4) official sentencing documents.xv 
Two additional points need to be made about PACER cases. First, these cases follow the typical 
pattern of adjudication of all criminal cases and are nearly all settled by plea bargain. Second, 
over half of the criminal cases were violations of 33 U.S.C. 1319 (1) and (2), a knowing or 
negligent discharge of pollutants into water from a point source. The next most common 
environmental crime was a violation of 42 U.S.C. 7413 (c) (1), a knowing violation of the Clean 
Air Act. Other common criminal violations included the illegal disposal of hazardous waste, the 
illegal use of pesticides, and the discharge of waste on protected lands. 
Data on the corporations’ numbers of employees and their revenue were obtained from 
ReferenceUSA and Dunn and Bradstreet, business databases that contain financial and 
demographic information for over 14 million companies.xvi We first consulted Dunn and 
Bradstreet, and if company data were missing from that source we then consulted ReferenceUSA 
as a backup. As a result, we were able to obtain data on nearly every company prosecuted. 
Finally, community demographics were obtained from the EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance 
History Online database (ECHO), which estimates demographic characteristics for one-mile radii 
around various EPA-permitted companies. All demographic data in ECHO that are used in this 
study are based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s STF 3A files (see http://echo.epa.gov/). While we 
are interested in race, ethnicity, and poverty, there are a variety of demographic data available in 
ECHO, including data on education, age, and sex. It would have been ideal to estimate 
demographic conditions around the hazardous waste sites at the time the company was 
sentenced, but censuses are carried out every decade, so these data were only collected once 
every ten years. However, 2009—the year when census data were collected—is relatively close 
in temporal proximity to the time of sentencing for the cases in our dataset (2005 to 2010). Thus, 
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if associations between demographics and monetary penalties do exist, the mismatch in temporal 
order is likely to introduce a small amount of random error that serves to decrease those 
associations. 
Missing Cases 
Not all criminal cases were posted in PACER because the court will sometimes order 
documents not to be released for public access. Reasons that cases are not released vary, but 
prohibited documents may contain things such as trade secrets or names of victims who are 
minors, among numerous other possibilities. Moreover, sometimes the court clerks simply 
become overburdened and do not scan in the documents. A total of 98 of the 245 cases we 
obtained from the EPA contained missing documents because information was not available in 
electronic format. As a result, these cases are excluded from the sample. In addition, 11 
corporations are not listed in the ReferenceUSA or the Dunn and Bradstreet databases and 
therefore are excluded from the analysis. Finally, 15 crimes occurred at corporate facilities 
located in areas where nobody was living, and therefore are also excluded from the study. This 
left a total of 121 cases to analyze, or 49% of the initial sample. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this analysis represents monetary sanctions assessed by the 
federal court (in dollars) against corporations that pled guilty to an environmental criminal 
violation between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2010. Monetary penalties for these 
criminal violations ranged from $500 to $6,179,634 across the 121 cases in the analysis. We 
study monetary sanctions because corporations cannot be imprisoned for violations of criminal 
law and corporate actors rarely serve prison time for environmental crime.xvii Therefore, 
monetary penalties are the primary punitive action taken by the government against a corporation 
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that violates a criminal law (Stretesky, 2006). We believe that larger financial penalties generally 
are more indicative of the severity of the crime (Atlas, 2001; Ringquist, 1998; Stretesky, 2006). 
Thus, we would expect that race and poverty are extralegal factors that should not be related to 
monetary penalties. If the race, ethnicity, and poverty composition of a community is related to 
environmental hazards, then potential environmental injustice may be occurring in the 
prosecution of environmental crimes.  
Independent Variables 
The ECHO database provided demographic information for people residing within a one-
mile radius of the environmental crime. We chose the one-mile radius in order to remain 
consistent with previous research examining environmental hazards (e.g., Atlas, 2001; Liu, 
2001).xviii The first variable of interest that we examine is the proportion of minorities (Hispanic 
and African American) living within a one-mile radius of where the environmental crime 
occurred. We examine the total proportion of minorities because environmental justice theories 
do not distinguish between the discrimination these two groups might face, and both are 
generally likely to be faced with higher levels of environmental hazards in their communities. 
Moreover, this variable is consistent with the work of Atlas (2001), who examined civil and 
administrative penalties. To compute the proportion of minorities in an area we added the 
number of African Americans and Hispanics living within one mile of the environmental crime 
together, and then divided by the total number of people residing within one mile.  
The second variable of interest that we examine is poverty. Consistent with previous 
environmental justice research, it is the poor who are more likely to be exposed to environmental 
hazards. Thus, the proportion of households that have combined annual incomes below the 
poverty line and are located within one mile of an environmental crime are examined in this 
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analysis. To compute the variable proportion poverty we divided the number of residents in 
poverty within one mile of the environmental crime and then divided by the population living 
within one mile.  
 
Control Variables 
In addition to environmental justice concerns, we control for additional variables that 
may impact penalty outcomes. Specifically, we control for company characteristics and case 
characteristics. Company characteristics impact criminal penalties because larger companies can 
afford to pay higher penalties. Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 3572 allows prosecutors and judges to levy 
fines that take into account the defendant’s financial situation, its number of employees, 
independent actions taken by the corporation to assist in cleanup, and the overall cooperation of 
the corporate defendant regarding the environmental hazard (18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(1)-(8)).xix 
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3573 even allows for modification or remission of fines assessed against 
a corporate defendant if the fine becomes too cumbersome to pay. This is demonstrated in U.S. v. 
ECO Finishing Company. In this case the prosecutors openly stated in the plea agreement 
(subsection “Sentencing Position of the United States,” pages 8-10) that the maximum fine they 
could assess against the defendant was incredibly high in light of the actual crime. Therefore, the 
fine assessed needed to be crafted in a way that was punitive, but also feasible, so as to not ruin 
the business. 
With this in mind, we control for (1) annual corporate sales, and (2) the number of 
employees working for corporate defendants. Annual corporate sales (in millions of dollars) 
were collected from ReferenceUSA and Dunn and Bradstreet for the company being charged 
with a criminal violation.xx The number of employees was also gathered from ReferenceUSA and 
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Dunn and Bradstreet, and represents the total number of employees in the corporation charged 
with a crime. As company sales and employees increase, we hypothesize that monetary penalties 
will also increase. 
Any analysis of penalty outcomes in law must also attempt to control for case 
characteristics—often referred to by lawyers as “the facts of a case.” More specifically, we 
control for (1) offense severity, differentiating between a felony and a misdemeanor prosecution; 
(2) how many aggravating circumstances exist in each case; and (3) whether the corporate 
defendant was fined civilly or criminally prior to the prosecution currently being analyzed. 
With these case characteristics in mind, we first created a dummy variable to differentiate 
between felonies (coded as “1”) and misdemeanors (coded as “0”). Every environmental statute 
that prescribes criminal sanctions distinguishes between felony and misdemeanor crimes. 
Generally, felony charges are reserved for the most severe violations of criminal law, while 
misdemeanor charges are for more minor violations. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) is a 
felony statute and allows for a punishment up to $500,000 for each violation, while 33 U.S.C. § 
1319(c)(1)(A) is a misdemeanor statute and only allows for a punishment up $250,000 for each 
violation. Therefore, we expect that if a case is prosecuted as a felony, this will be directly 
related to its incurring a higher fine. 
Another important case characteristic involves aggravating circumstances. An 
aggravating factor is “any circumstance attending the commission of a ‘crime’ or ‘tort’ which 
increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences, but which is above and 
beyond the essential constituents of the crime or tort itself” (Black, 1991). It is important to keep 
in mind that federal sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory but merely advisory, per the 
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker (2005). Prior to the Booker ruling, courts and prosecutors relied 
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upon the mandatory sentencing guidelines put forward by the U.S. Federal Probation Office. 
Though the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, courts and prosecutors still rely upon 
them to determine the appropriate fines to assess against corporations that commit environmental 
crimes. The full list is found in statutory provisions U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.1 through § 2Q1.6. The 
following are some examples of aggravating circumstances: (1) actual release of a regulated 
substance;xxi (2) violation of permit requirements;xxii (3) continuous release of a regulated 
substance;xxiii and (4) release of a regulated substance without a permit.xxiv Each PACER 
document listed the aggravating circumstances associated with the case. We count the total 
number of aggravating circumstances and then use those values as a proxy for case seriousness. 
The number of aggravating circumstances ranges from 0 to 6 (!=3). The greater the number of 
aggravating circumstances,xxv the higher the fine should be.  
Our final case characteristic is the number of previous corporate violations. Lynch, 
Stretesky, & Burns (2004) argue that a corporation’s criminal history is one possible penalty 
predictor, such that violations in the past make future violations more likely. As discussed above, 
environmental crime statutes require that prior history be a factor in determining penalties. As a 
result, we code for the past violation history of corporate defendants by counting the number of 
previous administrative, criminal, and civil violations. This information is reported by the EPA 
in its public database and was reported in PACER. Prior violations ranged between 0 and 9.xxvi 
Analysis and Results 
 To carry out our analysis of monetary fines, we examine the relationship between 
minority composition, poverty, and monetary penalties for the one-mile radii surrounding the 
locations of the criminal violations. As indicated by our hypotheses, an inverse association 
between criminal monetary violations and fines indicates that when environmental crimes occur 
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in minority and poor areas, the courts do not punish those crimes as severely. Such a finding 
would be indicative of environmental injustice. To estimate the relationships between 
demographic characteristics and penalty amounts we first examine mean and median 
relationships between minority, poverty, and penalty amounts. Next, we examine relationships 
controlling for company and case characteristics through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis. OLS is an appropriate statistical technique that can be used to estimate linear 
associations between interval/ratio level variables. In the present analysis, monetary penalties, 
proportion minority, and proportion in poverty represent ratio level variables. Another advantage 
of OLS is that it allows us to estimate the effects of variables of interest and controls 
simultaneously to rule out potential alternative explanations for environmental injustice that may 
also explain variation in penalty outcomes. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To begin, it is worth examining average fines and the average proportion of poor and 
minority individuals living within one mile of each criminal violation. This information is 
included in Table 1. Table 1 demonstrates that while the demographic variables (proportion in 
poverty and proportion minority) are relatively normally distributed across the one-mile-radius 
areas surrounding environmental violations, the dependent variable (penalty amount) is 
significantly skewed, as indicated by the large difference between the mean ($935,559) and 
median ($100,000) penalties. This skewedness contributes to the non-normally distributed 
residuals in the OLS models, which violate a primary statistical assumption. Thus, we 
transformed the dependent variable (as did Atlas, 2001) to its natural logarithm to improve the 
normality of the residuals. After the transformation of the penalty variable, the residuals in the 
regression models were normally distributed and so no further corrections were warranted. 
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 displays Pearson’s produce-moment correlations for the proportion minority, 
proportion in poverty, and the natural log of the penalty amount (the full correlation matrix is 
Appendix A). Both relationships were negative, suggesting that there could be some potential 
merit to the environmental injustice hypotheses (H1 and H2). However, these relationships are 
not statistically significant. Specifically, the correlation between proportion minority and penalty 
amount is –0.077, which represents a very weak relationship between the two variables. In 
addition, the correlation between poverty and penalties is –0.051. Again this relationship is very 
weak. Therefore, we suggest that in the case of bivariate relationships there is little indication of 
environmental injustice when it comes to criminal fines. 
Before turning to the multivariate findings, it is important to point out that we 
encountered problems with hetroskedasticityxxviiand multicollinearity.xxviii This occurred because 
the proportions of minority and poor residents are highly correlated (see Appendix A). As a 
result, the demographic variables were analyzed in two separate series of models (Tables 3 and 
4). When poverty and minority status variables are entered into different models 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity do not appear to influence standard errors or coefficient 
estimates.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Our regression results are displayed in Table 3. These results indicate that there is no 
support for our first hypothesis [H1]. Though the coefficients for the variable measuring the 
proportion of minority residents is in the predicted direction it is not statistically significant in 
any model estimated.  
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While not the focus of our analyses, the results do indicate that corporate revenue, 
aggravating factors, and felony status are the significant predictors of penalty amounts in 
criminal prosecutions. In both models 2 and 3, we see that as corporate revenue increases, the 
overall fine increases as well. This relationship is exactly what we would expect if prosecutors 
rely upon 18 U.S.C. § 3573 when they are crafting fines in a plea agreement. Further, we also 
find that corporations prosecuted for a felony rather than a misdemeanor generally receive a 
larger fine. This relationship is of no surprise because felony statutes—as we discussed above—
generally have larger fines associated with them. Finally, we find that as the number of 
aggravating factors increase, so does the amount of the penalty (p<0.01). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 Turning to our second hypothesis [H2], our results do not suggest a statistically 
significant relationship between populations below the poverty line and fines. As in Table 2, the 
coefficients are in the predicted direction. This suggests that environmental injustice is not a 
serious problem in criminal cases. As is the case in Table 3, the results in models 5 and 6 also 
show that corporate revenue, aggravating factors, and felony status are significant predictors in 
criminal prosecutions. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 This study is the first of its kind to analyze environmental justice concerns in the context 
of criminal penalties and therefore moves beyond the basic descriptive statistics often presented 
by traditional legal scholars (Brickey, 2001; Cohen, 1991; O’Hear, 2004). This research also 
contributes to the handful of studies (Atlas, 2001; Ringquist, 1998) on civil outcomes and lends 
support to the trends observed in those studies—namely, that we are unable to document the 
existence of systemic environmental injustice, which suggests that prosecutors take the 
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environmental justice mandate seriously (at least in their plea negotiations regarding penalties). 
That is, consistent with prior environmental justice research examining civil and administrative 
fines (Atlas, 2001; Ringquist, 1998), we find no statistically significant relationships between 
fines, minority status, and poverty. In fact, our results suggest that crime severity is the best 
predictor of penalties for corporations violating environmental criminal statutes. The argument 
that the severity of a crime is the best predictor of an outcome is traditional in legal scholarship 
and is a doctrine consistently taught in law school. Our results are right in line with this 
traditional way of thinking. 
 Like Atlas (2001) and Ringquist (1998) we do not find any evidence of systemic 
environmental injustice. However, based on the wider body of environmental justice scholarship 
we do not argue that there is an absence of environmental injustice in disadvantaged 
communities. Indeed, as we have pointed out, there are a significant number of empirical and 
case studies that suggest the opposite is true (Bullard, 1990). For example, it may be the case that 
more severe crimes occur in communities that are composed primarily of disadvantaged 
residents. If this is true, it could impact the analysis by artificially increasing the penalty amounts 
in poor and minority areas relative to more white and affluent areas that experience fewer 
environmental crimes. There is empirical support for this supposition. Specifically, Table 1 
reports that environmental crimes occur in areas where, on average, 29% of the residents live in 
poverty. Thus, a greater proportion of residents living near these crimes are poor than in the U.S. 
as a whole (i.e., 14% of all U.S. residents live in poverty). This suggests that it simply be the 
case that environmental injustice occurs because criminal corporations target the most 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Future research should examine this potential hypothesis.  
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This study is not without limitations. First, because there are few criminal prosecutions 
for environmental violations at the federal level, we examine relatively few cases. Moreover, 
data on corporate crime are often hard to gather, and while we were able to pull many case files, 
there were also many that were not released to the public. Thus, a number of cases were also 
absent from our analysis, which limited the generalizability of our findings, though it is unclear 
how missing data might impact the strength of the associations between race, ethnicity, and 
penalties. A second limitation is that we do not know anything about the processes that led to the 
detection of the environmental crimes that occurred, or about whether environmental injustices 
manifested themselves in that arena. Third, we recognize that some prosecutions were declined 
by DOJ and left to the states to prosecute if they chose to do so. Not only do we not know the 
outcomes of those cases and how they compared to federal outcomes, but we also do not know 
why these cases were declined by the federal authorities.  
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TABLE&1.&AVERAGE&(MEAN&AND&MEDIAN)&FINES,&PROPORTION&OF&MINORITY&RESIDENTS&LIVING&WITHIN&1&MILE&OF&VIOLATION,&AND&
PROPORTION&OF&RESIDENTS&LIVING&IN&POVERTY&WITHIN&1&MILE&OF&VIOLATION,&N=121&
&
Penalty(Amount( Proportion(Minority(
Proportion(in(
Poverty((
&
&
& &
Mean! $935,559! 0.23! 0.29!
Median! $100,000! 0.12! 0.30!
& &
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TABLE&2.&BIVARIATE&CORRELATIONS&BETWEEN&FINES,&PROPORTION&OF&MINORITY&RESIDENTS,&AND&PROPORTION&OF&RESIDENTS&LIVING&IN&
POVERTY,&N=121&
& Monetary(Penalty( %(Minority( %(Below(the(Poverty(Line(
Monetary(Penalty( !!1.000! ! !
Proportion(Minorities( –0.077! !!1.000! !
Proportion(in(Poverty( –0.051! !!0.508***! !!1.000!
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01!
& &
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TABLE&3.&ORDINARY&LEAST&SQUARES&REGRESSION&PREDICTING&THE&NATURAL&LOG&OF&CORPORATE&FINES,&N=121&
! Model&1& Model&2& Model&3&
! B! SE! ! B! SE! ! B! SE! !
Proportion(Minority( –0.62! 0.74! ! –0.68! 0.72! ! –0.93! 0.57! !
Corporate(Revenue((in(millions)( ! ! ! !!1.36*10
–5
! 5.12*10
–6
! ***! !!1.07*10
–5
! 4.07*10
–6
! **!
No.(Employees((in(thousands)( ! ! ! –2.58*10
–4
! 6.65*10
–4
! ! –2.95*10
–4
! 5.26*10
–4
! !
Aggravating(Factors( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.81! 0.12! ***!
Felony((1=yes)( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!1.10! 0.29! ***!
No.(Prior(Actions( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.05! 0.05! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Constant& 11.86! 0.28! ! 11.81! 0.34! ! !!8.70! 0.42! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
R
2
& !!0.01! ! ! !!0.06! ! ! !!0.44! ! !
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01! !
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!
TABLE&4.&ORDINARY&LEAST&SQUARES&REGRESSION&PREDICTING&THE&NATURAL&LOG&OF&CORPORATE&FINES,&N=121&
! Model&1& Model&2& Model&3&
! B! SE! ! B! SE! ! B! SE! !
Proportion(Below(Poverty( –0.75! 1.32! ! –0.75! 1.29! ! –0.58! 1.02! !
Corporate(Revenue((in(millions)( ! ! ! !!1.34*10
–5
! 5.13*10
–6
! **! !!1.05*10
–5
! 4.11*10
–6
! **!
No.(Employees((in(thousands)( ! ! ! –2.24*10
–4
! 6.67*10
–4
! ! –2.92*10
–4
! 5.33*10
–4
! !
Aggravating(Factors( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.81! 0.12! ***!
Felony((1=yes)( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!1.05! 0.29! ***!
No.(Prior(Actions( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.05! 0.05! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Constant& 11.85! 0.35! ! 11.78! 0.34! ! !!8.59! 0.46! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
R
2
& !!0.01! ! ! !!0.06! ! ! !!0.43! ! !
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01!
! !
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APPENDIX&A.&BIVARIATE&CORRELATIONS&FOR&ALL&VARIABLES,&N=121&
! 1( 2( 3( 4( 5( 6( 7( 8(
1.(Monetary(Penalty( !!1.00! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
2.(Proportion(Minority( –0.07! !!1.00! ! ! ! ! ! !
3.(Proportion(Below(Poverty( –0.05! !!0.51***! !!1.00! ! ! ! ! !
4.(Corporate(Revenue( !!0.23**! !!0.03! !!0.01! 1.00! ! ! ! !
5.(No.(Employees( !!0.01! !!0.01! !!0.06! 0.18**! !!1.00! ! ! !
6.(Aggravating(Factors( !!0.56***! !!0.01! –0.02! 0.06! !!0.09! 1.00! ! !
7.(Felony! !!0.38***! !!0.10! !!0.00! 0.06! –0.11! 0.21**! !!1.00! !
8.(No.(Prior(Actions( !!0.18*! !!0.00! –0.05! 0.17**! –0.00! 0.17*! –0.02! !!1.00!
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01!
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Endnotes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i
 This is the definition of environmental justice promoted by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (see http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/). 
ii
 The all-encompassing nature of green criminology has also stunted theoretical development. 
Lynch and Stretesky (2011, 293) note that “the multifaceted, issue-driven approach to the field” 
has slowed theory building in green criminology.  
iii
 As is the case with index crimes, criminal cases rarely go to trial. Indeed, of the cases we 
examine, none were settled at trial. Instead these cases were subject to plea bargains that were 
negotiated between the prosecution and defense. These plea bargains were then subject to the 
approval of the judge. As a result, we are unable to draw any conclusions about environmental 
penalties associated with trial outcomes.!
iv
 In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency does not file criminal charges 
against potential offenders. Instead, criminal prosecutions are handled by the U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
v
 The protest began when the Ward Transformer Company intentionally sprayed 31,000 gallons 
of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which are known to cause birth defects, liver disorders, and 
skin disorders, along approximately 270 miles of state roads in North Carolina (Begley, 1980; 
Bullard, 1990).  
vi
 http://www.justice.gov/ej/. 
vii
 http://www.justice.gov/ej/docs/env_enforcement-2427806-v2-
ej_doj_annual_report_fy2013.pdf. 
viii
 For example, there is a “chicken and egg” critique to levy at studies finding environmental 
injustice: did the facilities arrive first and the poor and minority communities follow, or was it 
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the other way around? Either scenario has direct implications for determining how an 
environmental injustice is actually manifesting itself. In addition, some scholars argue that this is 
a false debate and that regardless of why the pattern exists it still represents an injustice, as 
institutional discrimination (e.g., bank lending practices, structural inequality) likely produced 
the pattern of where vulnerable populations settle (see Rhodes, 2005). 
ix
 This was quite an accusation, and as a result it attracted the attention of the EPA, Congress, 
and academia. The EPA initiated an internal review of its practices and now publishes annual 
public reports regarding concerns of environmental justice and enforcement. The DOJ has 
effectively mimicked the EPA and also reports on civil and criminal actions it takes, and how 
those actions are in furtherance of environmental justice concerns. Congress even launched an 
inquiry into the EPA and DOJ regarding civil and criminal law enforcement and case prosecution 
(Brickey, 1996). 
x
 Specifically, Ringquist argued that the political party of the presiding judge would influence the 
plea agreement. Further, he hypothesized that Fortune 500 corporations would receive less harsh 
punishments than non–Fortune 500 corporations. 
xi
 In fact, Atlas (2001) found there was a positive relationship between minority populations 
surrounding environmental hazards and fines assessed against corporations for environmental 
law violations. 
xii
 Ideally the date range would be longer. In order to obtain court documents the first author had 
to create a PACER account (see note xvi) and pay 10 cents per page for every document 
acquired. Some plea agreements were as long as 90 pages. Because the first author paid the fees 
out of pocket, financial constraints forced a shorter date range. Even so, our date range is 
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consistent with prior research related to this topic (e.g., Atlas [2001] examined cases from 1985-
1991, a six-year range).  
xiii
 If a corporation was referred to the DOJ by the EPA for prosecution and the DOJ declined 
prosecution, the EPA still provided case information. That information included the state 
agencies that prosecuted the corporation using state laws as opposed to federal laws. Of the 245 
corporate cases prosecuted between 2005 and 2010, seven were prosecuted at the state level. 
These seven cases were excluded from this analysis. 
xiv
 PACER is the name of the electronic database where all case files that are part of any federal 
legal action are stored for public access. Access is not free and requires a quarterly fee as well as 
a charge of 10 cents per page for printing/downloading.  
xv
 Sometimes these documents are part of a plea agreement and are not in a separate document. 
xvi
 Both the ReferenceUSA and Dunn and Bradstreet databases are recognized as accurate 
reporters of corporate finances, and there are no known reasons to believe the data reported are 
inaccurate, so the databases serve as worthwhile sources of company information. 
xvii
 It should be noted that corporate officers and employees can be imprisoned for violation of 
environmental laws under the responsible corporate officer doctrine (Lazarus, 1995). 
xviii
 For a discussion of why concentric ring measurement is better than using zip codes to 
measure demographics, see Liu (2001). 
xix
 Every plea agreement in this study explicitly states that 18 U.S.C. § 3572 is the statute relied 
upon to determine appropriate penalties. 
xx
 Both databases only report gross revenues. Ideally any analysis would involve using both 
gross and net revenues, but due to the way the databases report we are able to use only gross 
revenues.  
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xxi
 U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(a). 
xxii
 U.S.S.C. § 2Q1.2(b)(4). 
xxiii
 U.S.S.C. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A). 
xxiv
 Ibid. 
xxv
 Unfortunately we do not know what specific evidence (e.g., test results, expert witness 
testimony, etc.) is used in determining how many aggravating factors are met, or in determining 
if a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony. This is important information to know and worthy of 
future investigation—our case files simply do not make specific reference to evidence used to 
facilitate prosecutorial decision-making. 
xxvi
 In our dataset 30 corporations had at least 1 prior fine for an environmental violation. 
Specifically, 17 corporations (the majority) had only 1 violation, and 1 corporation had 9 prior 
violations of environmental laws. The remaining 91 corporations are first-time offenders. 
xxvii
!In this analysis, theoretical reasoning suggests that we pay particular attention to violations 
of homoscedastic errors. In short, it is possible that Environmental Protection Agency inspectors 
and Department of Justice prosecutors better monitor larger corporations. This disproportionate 
monitoring may cause differential error in residuals according to corporate size, and therefore 
may introduce heteroskedasticity into the model estimates and distort standard errors. An 
examination of model residuals with respect to company size (employees and annual revenue) 
suggests that heteroskewdasticity is not a problem for these models.  
xxviii
 We also assess the likelihood that multicollinearity may impact model coefficients and 
standard errors. We did not, however, see any evidence that multicollinearity was a problem, as 
bivariate correlations (Appendix A) do not appear to exceed 0.26, indicating weak bivariate 
associations. Moreover, average variance inflation factor (VIF) scores did not exceed 1.13 in any 
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of the models we estimated. Most of the time these VIF scores were near 1.05. This provides 
significant evidence that multicollinearity that resulted from a particular combination of 
variables had little if any impact on model coefficients and standard errors.!
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TABLE&1.&AVERAGE&(MEAN&AND&MEDIAN)&FINES,&PROPORTION&OF&MINORITY&RESIDENTS&LIVING&WITHIN&1&MILE&OF&VIOLATION,&AND&
PROPORTION&OF&RESIDENTS&LIVING&IN&POVERTY&WITHIN&1&MILE&OF&VIOLATION,&N=121&
&
Penalty(Amount( Proportion(Minority(
Proportion(in(
Poverty((
&
&
& &
Mean! $935,559! 0.23! 0.29!
Median! $100,000! 0.12! 0.30!
& &
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TABLE&2.&BIVARIATE&CORRELATIONS&BETWEEN&FINES,&PROPORTION&OF&MINORITY&RESIDENTS,&AND&PROPORTION&OF&RESIDENTS&LIVING&IN&
POVERTY,&N=121&
& Monetary(Penalty( %(Minority( %(Below(the(Poverty(Line(
Monetary(Penalty( !!1.000! ! !
Proportion(Minorities( –0.077! !!1.000! !
Proportion(in(Poverty( –0.051! !!0.508***! !!1.000!
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01!
& &
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TABLE&3.&ORDINARY&LEAST&SQUARES&REGRESSION&PREDICTING&THE&NATURAL&LOG&OF&CORPORATE&FINES,&N=121&
! Model&1& Model&2& Model&3&
! B! SE! ! B! SE! ! B! SE! !
Proportion(Minority( –0.62! 0.74! ! –0.68! 0.72! ! –0.93! 0.57! !
Corporate(Revenue((in(millions)( ! ! ! !!1.36*10
–5
! 5.12*10
–6
! ***! !!1.07*10
–5
! 4.07*10
–6
! **!
No.(Employees((in(thousands)( ! ! ! –2.58*10
–4
! 6.65*10
–4
! ! –2.95*10
–4
! 5.26*10
–4
! !
Aggravating(Factors( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.81! 0.12! ***!
Felony((1=yes)( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!1.10! 0.29! ***!
No.(Prior(Actions( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.05! 0.05! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Constant& 11.86! 0.28! ! 11.81! 0.34! ! !!8.70! 0.42! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
R
2
& !!0.01! ! ! !!0.06! ! ! !!0.44! ! !
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01! !
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!
TABLE&4.&ORDINARY&LEAST&SQUARES&REGRESSION&PREDICTING&THE&NATURAL&LOG&OF&CORPORATE&FINES,&N=121&
! Model&1& Model&2& Model&3&
! B! SE! ! B! SE! ! B! SE! !
Proportion(Below(Poverty( –0.75! 1.32! ! –0.75! 1.29! ! –0.58! 1.02! !
Corporate(Revenue((in(millions)( ! ! ! !!1.34*10
–5
! 5.13*10
–6
! **! !!1.05*10
–5
! 4.11*10
–6
! **!
No.(Employees((in(thousands)( ! ! ! –2.24*10
–4
! 6.67*10
–4
! ! –2.92*10
–4
! 5.33*10
–4
! !
Aggravating(Factors( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.81! 0.12! ***!
Felony((1=yes)( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!1.05! 0.29! ***!
No.(Prior(Actions( ! ! ! ! ! ! !!0.05! 0.05! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Constant& 11.85! 0.35! ! 11.78! 0.34! ! !!8.59! 0.46! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
R
2
& !!0.01! ! ! !!0.06! ! ! !!0.43! ! !
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01!
! !
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APPENDIX&A.&BIVARIATE&CORRELATIONS&FOR&ALL&VARIABLES,&N=121&
! 1( 2( 3( 4( 5( 6( 7( 8(
1.(Monetary(Penalty( !!1.00! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
2.(Proportion(Minority( –0.07! !!1.00! ! ! ! ! ! !
3.(Proportion(Below(Poverty( –0.05! !!0.51***! !!1.00! ! ! ! ! !
4.(Corporate(Revenue( !!0.23**! !!0.03! !!0.01! 1.00! ! ! ! !
5.(No.(Employees( !!0.01! !!0.01! !!0.06! 0.18**! !!1.00! ! ! !
6.(Aggravating(Factors( !!0.56***! !!0.01! –0.02! 0.06! !!0.09! 1.00! ! !
7.(Felony! !!0.38***! !!0.10! !!0.00! 0.06! –0.11! 0.21**! !!1.00! !
8.(No.(Prior(Actions( !!0.18*! !!0.00! –0.05! 0.17**! –0.00! 0.17*! –0.02! !!1.00!
*p<0.10;!**p<0.05;!***p<0.01!
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Endnotes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i
 This is the definition of environmental justice promoted by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (see http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/). 
ii
 The all-encompassing nature of green criminology has also stunted theoretical development. 
Lynch and Stretesky (2011, 293) note that “the multifaceted, issue-driven approach to the field” 
has slowed theory building in green criminology.  
iii
 As is the case with index crimes, criminal cases rarely go to trial. Indeed, of the cases we 
examine, none were settled at trial. Instead these cases were subject to plea bargains that were 
negotiated between the prosecution and defense. These plea bargains were then subject to the 
approval of the judge. As a result, we are unable to draw any conclusions about environmental 
penalties associated with trial outcomes.!
iv
 In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency does not file criminal charges 
against potential offenders. Instead, criminal prosecutions are handled by the U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
v
 The protest began when the Ward Transformer Company intentionally sprayed 31,000 gallons 
of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which are known to cause birth defects, liver disorders, and 
skin disorders, along approximately 270 miles of state roads in North Carolina (Begley, 1980; 
Bullard, 1990).  
vi
 http://www.justice.gov/ej/. 
vii
 http://www.justice.gov/ej/docs/env_enforcement-2427806-v2-
ej_doj_annual_report_fy2013.pdf. 
viii
 For example, there is a “chicken and egg” critique to levy at studies finding environmental 
injustice: did the facilities arrive first and the poor and minority communities follow, or was it 
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the other way around? Either scenario has direct implications for determining how an 
environmental injustice is actually manifesting itself. In addition, some scholars argue that this is 
a false debate and that regardless of why the pattern exists it still represents an injustice, as 
institutional discrimination (e.g., bank lending practices, structural inequality) likely produced 
the pattern of where vulnerable populations settle (see Rhodes, 2005). 
ix
 This was quite an accusation, and as a result it attracted the attention of the EPA, Congress, 
and academia. The EPA initiated an internal review of its practices and now publishes annual 
public reports regarding concerns of environmental justice and enforcement. The DOJ has 
effectively mimicked the EPA and also reports on civil and criminal actions it takes, and how 
those actions are in furtherance of environmental justice concerns. Congress even launched an 
inquiry into the EPA and DOJ regarding civil and criminal law enforcement and case prosecution 
(Brickey, 1996). 
x
 Specifically, Ringquist argued that the political party of the presiding judge would influence the 
plea agreement. Further, he hypothesized that Fortune 500 corporations would receive less harsh 
punishments than non–Fortune 500 corporations. 
xi
 In fact, Atlas (2001) found there was a positive relationship between minority populations 
surrounding environmental hazards and fines assessed against corporations for environmental 
law violations. 
xii
 Ideally the date range would be longer. In order to obtain court documents the first author had 
to create a PACER account (see note xvi) and pay 10 cents per page for every document 
acquired. Some plea agreements were as long as 90 pages. Because the first author paid the fees 
out of pocket, financial constraints forced a shorter date range. Even so, our date range is 
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consistent with prior research related to this topic (e.g., Atlas [2001] examined cases from 1985-
1991, a six-year range).  
xiii
 If a corporation was referred to the DOJ by the EPA for prosecution and the DOJ declined 
prosecution, the EPA still provided case information. That information included the state 
agencies that prosecuted the corporation using state laws as opposed to federal laws. Of the 245 
corporate cases prosecuted between 2005 and 2010, seven were prosecuted at the state level. 
These seven cases were excluded from this analysis. 
xiv
 PACER is the name of the electronic database where all case files that are part of any federal 
legal action are stored for public access. Access is not free and requires a quarterly fee as well as 
a charge of 10 cents per page for printing/downloading.  
xv
 Sometimes these documents are part of a plea agreement and are not in a separate document. 
xvi
 Both the ReferenceUSA and Dunn and Bradstreet databases are recognized as accurate 
reporters of corporate finances, and there are no known reasons to believe the data reported are 
inaccurate, so the databases serve as worthwhile sources of company information. 
xvii
 It should be noted that corporate officers and employees can be imprisoned for violation of 
environmental laws under the responsible corporate officer doctrine (Lazarus, 1995). 
xviii
 For a discussion of why concentric ring measurement is better than using zip codes to 
measure demographics, see Liu (2001). 
xix
 Every plea agreement in this study explicitly states that 18 U.S.C. § 3572 is the statute relied 
upon to determine appropriate penalties. 
xx
 Both databases only report gross revenues. Ideally any analysis would involve using both 
gross and net revenues, but due to the way the databases report we are able to use only gross 
revenues.  
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xxi
 U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(a). 
xxii
 U.S.S.C. § 2Q1.2(b)(4). 
xxiii
 U.S.S.C. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A). 
xxiv
 Ibid. 
xxv
 Unfortunately we do not know what specific evidence (e.g., test results, expert witness 
testimony, etc.) is used in determining how many aggravating factors are met, or in determining 
if a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony. This is important information to know and worthy of 
future investigation—our case files simply do not make specific reference to evidence used to 
facilitate prosecutorial decision-making. 
xxvi
 In our dataset 30 corporations had at least 1 prior fine for an environmental violation. 
Specifically, 17 corporations (the majority) had only 1 violation, and 1 corporation had 9 prior 
violations of environmental laws. The remaining 91 corporations are first-time offenders. 
xxvii
!In this analysis, theoretical reasoning suggests that we pay particular attention to violations 
of homoscedastic errors. In short, it is possible that Environmental Protection Agency inspectors 
and Department of Justice prosecutors better monitor larger corporations. This disproportionate 
monitoring may cause differential error in residuals according to corporate size, and therefore 
may introduce heteroskedasticity into the model estimates and distort standard errors. An 
examination of model residuals with respect to company size (employees and annual revenue) 
suggests that heteroskewdasticity is not a problem for these models.  
xxviii
 We also assess the likelihood that multicollinearity may impact model coefficients and 
standard errors. We did not, however, see any evidence that multicollinearity was a problem, as 
bivariate correlations (Appendix A) do not appear to exceed 0.26, indicating weak bivariate 
associations. Moreover, average variance inflation factor (VIF) scores did not exceed 1.13 in any 
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of the models we estimated. Most of the time these VIF scores were near 1.05. This provides 
significant evidence that multicollinearity that resulted from a particular combination of 
variables had little if any impact on model coefficients and standard errors.!
